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\title {Origins of Mind \\ Lecture 04}
 
\maketitle
 

Origins of Mind

Lecture 04

\def \ititle {Lecture 04}
\begin{center}
{\Large
\textbf{\ititle}
}
 
\iemail %
\end{center}
\section{Background}
Knowledge of objects depends on abilities to (i) segment objects, (ii) represent them as persisting and (iii) track their interactions.
\emph{Question 1} When do humans come to meet the three requirements on knowledge of objects?
\emph{Discovery 1} Infants manfiest all three abilities from around four months of age or earlier.
\emph{Question 2} How do humans come to meet the three requirements on knowledge of objects?
\emph{Discovery 2} Although abilities to segment objects, to represent them as persisting through occlusion and to track their causal interactions are conceptually distinct, they are all characterised by the Principles of Object Perception and they may all be consequences of a single mechanism.
\emph{Question 3} What is the relation between the model specified by the Principles of Object Perception and the infants?
\textit{The simple view} The principles of object perception are things that we know or believe, and we generate expectations from these principles by a process of inference.
The \emph{Core Knowledge View} The principles of object perception are not knowledge, but they are core knowledge. And we generate expectations from these principles by a process of inference.
\emph{Discovery 3} The Simple View generates systematically false predictions. (And the Core Knowledge View generates no relevant predictions by itself.)
\emph{Question 4} What is the relation between adults’ and infants’ abilities concerning physical objects and their causal interactions?

How do humans first come to know simple facts about particular physical objects?

The question for this course is ... Our current question is about physical objects. How do humans first come to know simple facts about particular physical objects?
In attempting to answer this question, we are focussing on the abilities of infants in the first six months of life.
What have we found so far? ...

What have we found so far? ... Apparently conflicting evidence.

Recall the puzzle ....

Spelke et al 1992, figure 2

Berthier et al, Where’s the ball reaching study

Baillargeon et al 1987, figure 1

Shinskey and Munakata 2001, figure 1

More than two decades of research strongly supports the view that infants fail to search for objects hidden behind barriers or screens until around eight months of age \citep[p.\ 202]{Meltzoff:1998wp} or maybe even later \citep{moore:2008_factors}. Researchers have carefully controlled for the possibility that infants’ failures to search are due to extraneous demands on memory or the control of action. We must therefore conclude, I think, that four- and five-month-old infants do not have beliefs about the locations of briefly occluded objects. It is the absence of belief that explains their failures to search.
occlusionendarkening
violation-of-expectations

Charles & Rivera (2009)

Here’s what we’ve found so far.
We examined how three requirements on having knowledge of physical objects are met. Knowledge of objects depends on abilities to (i) segment objects, (ii) represent them as persisting and (iii) track their interactions. To know simple facts about particular physical objects you need, minimally, to meet these three requirements.

Three requirements

  • segment objects
  • represent objects as persisting (‘permanence’)
  • track objects’ interactions
The second discovery concerned how infants meet these three requirements this.

Principles of Object Perception

  • cohesion—‘two surface points lie on the same object only if the points are linked by a path of connected surface points’
  • boundedness—‘two surface points lie on distinct objects only if no path of connected surface points links them’
  • rigidity—‘objects are interpreted as moving rigidly if such an interpretation exists’
  • no action at a distance—‘separated objects are interpreted as moving independently of one another if such an interpretation exists’

Spelke, 1990

The second was that a single set of principles is formally adequate to explain how someone could meet these requirements, and to describe infants' abilities with segmentation, representing objects as persisting and tracking objects' interactions.
This is exciting in several ways. \begin{enumerate} \item That infants have all of these abilities. \item That their abilities are relatively sophisticated: it doesn’t seem that we can characterise them as involving simple heuristics or relying merely on featural information. \item That a single set of principles underlies all three capacities. \end{enumerate}

three requirements, one set of principles

three requirements, one set of principles: this suggests us that infants’ capacities are characterised by a model of the physical.

Three Questions

1. How do four-month-old infants model physical objects?

2. What is the relation between the model and the infants?

3. What is the relation between the model and the things modelled (physical objects)?

[slide: model] three requirements, one set of principles: this suggests us that infants’ capacities are characterised by a model of the physical (as opposed to being a collection of unrelated capacities that only appear, but don’t really, have anything to do with physical objects).
1. How do four-month-old infants model physical objects?
In asking how infants model physical objects, we are seeking to understand not how physical objects in fact are but how they appear from the point of view of an individual or system.
The model need not be thought of as something used by the system: it is a tool the theorist uses in describing what the system is for and broadly how it works. This therefore leads us to a second question ...
2. What is the relation between the model and the infants?
3. What is the relation between the model and the things modelled (physical objects)?

Two Candidate Answers to Q2

the Simple View ... generates incorrect predictions

the Core Knowledge View ... generates no relevant predictions

Let’s build on the simple view, extending it so that we do generate relevant predictions.
(There were also theoretical objections: maybe we can overcome these by extending it too.)
 

The CLSTX Hypothesis: Object Indexes Underpin Infants’ Abilities

 
\section{The CLSTX Hypothesis: Object Indexes Underpin Infants’ Abilities}
 
\section{The CLSTX Hypothesis: Object Indexes Underpin Infants’ Abilities}

Three requirements

  • segment objects
  • represent objects as persisting (‘permanence’)
  • track objects’ interactions

How? Object Indexes!

In adult humans, there is a system of object indexes which enables them to track potentially moving objects in ongoing actions such as visually tracking or reaching for objects, and which influences how their attention is allocated \citep{flombaum:2008_attentional}.
The leading, best defended hypothesis is that their abilities to do so depend on a system of object indexes like that which underpins multiple object tracking or object-specific preview benefits \citep{Leslie:1998zk,Scholl:1999mi,Carey:2001ue,scholl:2007_objecta}.
But what is an object index? Formally, an object index is ‘a mental token that functions as a pointer to an object’ \citep[p.\ 11]{Leslie:1998zk}. If you imagine using your fingers to track moving objects, an object index is the mental counterpart of a finger \citep[p.~68]{pylyshyn:1989_role}.
Leslie et al say an object index is ‘a mental token that functions as a pointer to an object’ \citep[p.\ 11]{Leslie:1998zk}
‘Pylyshyn’s FINST model: you have four or five indexes which can be attached to objects; it’s a bit like having your fingers on an object: you might not know anything about the object, but you can say where it is relative to the other objects you’re fingering. (ms. 19-20)’ \citep{Scholl:1999mi}
The interesting thing about object indexes is that a system of object indexes (at least one, maybe more) appears to underpin cognitive processes which are not strictly perceptual but also do not involve beliefs or knowledge states. While I can’t fully explain the evidence for this claim here, I do want to mention the two basic experimental tools that are used to investigate the existence of, and the principles underpinning, a system of object indexes which operates between perception and thought ...
Object indexes ... \begin{itemize} \item guide ongoing action (e.g.~visual tracking, reaching) \item influence how attention is allocated \citep{flombaum:2008_attentional} \item can be assigned in ways incompatible with beliefs and knowledge \citep[e.g.][]{Mitroff:2004pc, mitroff:2007_space} \item have behavioural and neural markers, in adults and infants \citep{richardson:2004_multimodal,kaufman:2005_oscillatory}. \item are subject to signature limits \citep[pp.~83--87]{carey:2009_origin} \item sometimes survive occlusion \citep{flombaum:2006_temporal} \end{itemize}
Suppose you are shown a display involving eight stationary circles, like this one.
 
Four of these circles flash, indicating that you should track these circles.
All eight circles now begin to move around rapidly, and keep moving unpredictably for some time.
Then they stop and one of the circles flashes. Your task is to say whether the flashing circle is one you were supposed to track. Adults are good at this task \citep{pylyshyn:1988_tracking}, indicating that they can use at least four object indexes simultaneously.
(\emph{Aside.} That this experiment provides evidence for the existence of a system of object indexes has been challenged. See \citet[p.\ 59]{scholl:2009_what}: \begin{quote} `I suggest that what Pylyshyn’s (2004) experiments show is exactly what they intuitively seem to show: We can keep track of the targets in MOT, but not which one is which. [...] all of this seems easily explained [...] by the view that MOT is simply realized by split object-based attention to the MOT targets as a set.' \end{quote} It is surely right that the existence of MOT does not, all by itself, provide support for the existence of a system of object indexes. However, contra what Scholl seems to be suggesting here, the MOT paradigm can be adapated to provide such evidence. Thus, for instance, \citet{horowitz:2010_direction} show that, in a MOT paradigm, observers can report the direction of one or two targets without advance knowledge of which targets' directions they will be asked to report.)

Pylyshyn 2001, figure 6

There is a behavioural marker of object-indexes called the object-specific preview benefit. Suppose that you are shown an array of two objects, as depicted here. At the start a letter appears briefly on each object. (It is not important that letters are used; in theory, any readily distinguishable features should work.)
The objects now start moving.
At the end of the task, a letter appears on one of the objects. Your task is to say whether this letter is one of the letters that appeared at the start or whether it is a new letter. Consider just those cases in which the answer is yes: the letter at the end is one of those which you saw at the start. Of interest is how long this takes you to respond in two cases: when the letter appears on the same object at the start and end, and, in contrast, when the letter appears on one object at the start and a different object at the end. It turns out that most people can answer the question more quickly in the first case. That is, they are faster when a letter appears on the same object twice than when it appears on two different objects \citep{Kahneman:1992xt}. This difference in response times is the % $glossary: object-specific preview benefit \emph{object-specific preview benefit}. Its existence shows that, in this task, you are keeping track of which object is which as they move. This is why the existence of an object-specific preview benefit is taken to be evidence that object indexes exist.

Kahneman et al 1992, figure 3

The \emph{object-specific preview benefit} is the reduction in time needed to identify that a letter (or other feature) matches a target presented earlier when the letter and target both appear on the same object rather than on different objects.

What is required for assigning and maintaining object indexes?

To see the need for principles, return to the old-fashioned logistician who is keeping track of supply trucks. In doing this she has only quite limited information to go on. She receives sporadic reports that a supply truck has been sighted at one or another location. But these reports do not specify which supply truck is at that location. She must therefore work out which pin to move to the newly reported location. In doing this she might rely on assumptions about the trucks’ movements being constrained to trace continuous paths, and about the direction and speed of the trucks typically remaining constant. These assumptions allow her to use the sporadic reports that some truck or other is there in forming views about the routes a particular truck has taken. A system of object indexes faces the same problem when the indexed objects are not continuously perceptible. What assumptions or principles are used to determine whether this object at time $t_1$ and that object at time $t_2$ have the same object index pinned to them?
[object indexes and segmentation: ducks picture] Is one object index assigned or two? Assigning object indexes requires segmentation.
[object indexes and segmentation: partially occluded stick]

Spelke, 1990 figure 2a

  • cohesion—‘two surface points lie on the same object only if the points are linked by a path of connected surface points’
  • rigidity—‘objects are interpreted as moving rigidly if such an interpretation exists’
     
Consider a stick moving behind a screen, so that the middle part of it is occluded. Assigning one index even though there is no information about continuity of surfaces may depend on analysis of motion.
[object indexes and representing occluded objects]

 

principle of continuity---

an object traces exactly one connected path over space and time

Franconeri et at, 2012 figure 2a (part)

[Here we’re interested in the issue rather than the details: the point is just that continuity of motion is important for assigning and maintaining object indexes.]
Suppose object indexes are being used in tracking four or more objects simultaneously and one of these objects—call it the \emph{first object}—disappears behind a barrier. Later two objects appear from behind the barrier, one on the far side of the barrier (call this the \emph{far object}) and one close to the point where the object disappeared (call this the \emph{near object}). If the system of object indexes relies on assumptions about speed and direction of movement, then the first object and the far object should be assigned the same object index. But this is not what typically happens. Instead it is likely that the first object and the near object are assigned the same object index.% \footnote{ See \citet{franconeri:2012_simple}. Note that this corrects an earlier argument for a contrary view \citep{scholl:1999_tracking}. } If this were what always happened, then we could not fully explain how infants represent objects as persisting by appeal to object indexes because, at least in some cases, infants do use assumptions about speed and direction in interpolating the locations of briefly unperceived objects. There would be a discrepancy between the Principles of Object Perception which characterise how infants represent objects as persisting and the principles that describe how object indexes work.
But this is not the whole story about object indexes. It turns out that object indexes behave differently when just one object is being tracked and the object-specific preview benefit is used to detect them. In this case it seems that assumptions about continuity and constancy in speed and direction do play a role in determining whether an object at $t_1$ and an object at $t_2$ are assigned the same object indexes \citep{flombaum:2006_temporal,mitroff:2007_space}. In the terms introduced in the previous paragraph, in this case where just one object is being tracked, the first object and the far object are assigned the same object index. This suggests that the principles which govern object indexes may match the principles which characterise how infants represent objects as persisting.
[object indexes and representing causal interactions]

For assigning and maintaining object indexes,

Three requirements

  • segment objects
  • represent objects as persisting (‘permanence’)
  • track objects’ interactions
The Principles of Object Perception are the key to specifying one way of meeting these three requirements.
This suggests that, maybe, The Principles of Object Perception which characterise infants’ abilities to track physical objects also characterise the operations of a system of object indexes.
\emph{The CLSTX conjecture} Infants’ abilities concerning physical objects are characterised by the Principles of Object Perception because infants’ abilities are a consequence of the operations of a system of object indexes \citep{Leslie:1998zk,Scholl:1999mi,Carey:2001ue,scholl:2007_objecta}.

The CLSTX conjecture:

The principles of object perception

are not things believed or known:

instead

they characterise the operation of

object indexes.

Leslie et al (1989); Scholl and Leslie (1999); Carey and Xu (2001)

(‘CLSTX’ stands for Carey-Leslie-Scholl-Tremoulet-Xu \citep[see][]{Leslie:1998zk,Scholl:1999mi,Carey:2001ue,scholl:2007_objecta})
Their upshot is not knowledge about particular objects and their movements but rather a perceptual representation involving an object index.
One reason the hypothesis seems like a good bet is that object indexes are the kind of thing which could in principle explain infants’ abilities to track unperceived objects because object indexes can, within limits, survive occlusion.
Note that the CLSTX conjecture assumes that the Principles of Object Perception which characterise infants’ abilities to track physical objects also characterise the operations of a system of object indexes.
:treflecting on \citet{mccurry:2009_beyond} in one of the seminars ... distinguishedinitiating action and continuing to perform an action ... object indexes supportguidance of action but not its initiation.
This amazing discovery is going to take us a while to fully digest. As a first step, note its significance for Davidson's challenge about characterising what is going on in the head of the child who has a few words, or even no words.
\footnote{\label{fn:mot_proximity} The findings cited in this paragraph all involve measuring object-specific preview benefits. Some researchers have argued that in multiple object tracking with at least four objects, motion information is not used to update indexes during the occlusion of the corresponding objects \citep{keane:2006_motion,horowitz:2006_how}; rather, `MOT through occlusion seems to rely on a simple heuristic based only on the proximity of reappearance locations to the objects’ last known preocclusion locations' (\citealp{franconeri:2012_simple}, p.\ 700). However information about motion is sometimes available \citep{horowitz:2010_direction} and used in tracking multiple objects simultaneously \citep{howe:2012_motion, clair:2012_phd}. One possibility is that, in tracking four objects simultaneously, motion information can be used to distinguish targets from distractors but not to predict the future positions of objects \citep[p.\ 8]{howe:2012_motion}. }

Three Questions

1. How do four-month-old infants model physical objects?

2. What is the relation between the model and the infants?

3. What is the relation between the model and the things modelled (physical objects)?

2. What is the relation between the model and the infants?

Candidate Answers to Q2

the Simple View ... generates incorrect predictions

the Core Knowledge View ... generates no relevant predictions

the CLSTX Conjecture

evidence?

behavioural and neural indicators

behavioural: OSPB-like-effect (Richardson & Kirkham; note their caveats); neural Kaufmann, Csibra et al
If we consider six-month-olds, we can also find behavioural markers of object indexes in infants \citep{richardson:2004_multimodal} ...
... and there are is also a report of neural markers too \citep{kaufman:2005_oscillatory}.

Kaufmann et al, 2015 figure 1

(\citet{kaufman:2005_oscillatory} measured brain activity in six-month-olds infants as they observed a display typical of an object disappearing behind a barrier. (EEG gama oscillation over right temporal cortex) They found the pattern of brain activity characteristic of maintaining an object index. This suggests that in infants, as in adults, object indexes can attach to objects that are briefly unperceived.)

Kaufmann et al, 2015 figure 2 (part)

The evidence we have so far gets us as far as saying, in effect, that someone capable of committing a murder was in the right place at the right time. Can we go beyond such circumstantial evidence?

Signature Limits

The key to doing this is to exploit signature limits.
A \emph{{signature limit} of a system} is a pattern of behaviour the system exhibits which is both defective given what the system is for and peculiar to that system.
\citet{carey:2009_origin} argues that what I am calling the signature limits of object indexes in adults are related to signature limits on infants’ abilities to track briefly occluded objects.

Scholl 2007, figure 4

To illustrate, a moment ago I mentioned that one signature limit of object indexes is that featural information sometimes fails to influence how objects are assigned in ways that seem quite dramatic.

Carey and Xu 2001, figure 3

There is evidence that, similarly, even 10-month-olds will sometimes ignore featural information in tracking occluded objects \citep{xu:1996_infants}.% \footnote{ This argument is complicated by evidence that infants around 10 months of age do not always fail to use featural information appropriately in representing objects as persisting \citep{wilcox:2002_infants}. In fact \citet{mccurry:2009_beyond} report evidence that even five-month-olds can make use of featural information in representing objects as persisting \citep[see also][]{wilcox:1999_object}. %they use a fringe and a reaching paradigm. NB the reaching is a problem for the simple interpretation of looking vs reaching! % NB: I think they are tapping into motor representations of affordances. Likewise, object indexes are not always updated in ways that amount to ignoring featural information \citep{hollingworth:2009_object,moore:2010_features}. It remains to be seen whether there is really an exact match between the signature limit on object indexes and the signature limit on four-month-olds’ abilities to represent objects as persisting. The hypothesis under consideration---that infants’ abilities to track briefly occluded objects depend on a system of object indexes like that which underpins multiple object tracking or object-specific preview benefits---is a bet on the match being exact. }

Xu and Carey 1996, figure 4

\emph{The CLSTX conjecture} Infants’ abilities concerning physical objects are characterised by the Principles of Object Perception because infants’ abilities are a consequence of the operations of a system of object indexes \citep{Leslie:1998zk,Scholl:1999mi,Carey:2001ue,scholl:2007_objecta}.

The CLSTX conjecture:

The principles of object perception

are not things believed or known:

instead

they characterise the operation of

object indexes.

Leslie et al (1989); Scholl and Leslie (1999); Carey and Xu (2001)

(‘CLSTX’ stands for Carey-Leslie-Scholl-Tremoulet-Xu \citep[see][]{Leslie:1998zk,Scholl:1999mi,Carey:2001ue,scholl:2007_objecta})
While I wouldn’t want to suggest that the evidence on siganture limits is decisive, I think it does motivate considering the hypothesis and its consequences. In what follows I will assume the hypothesis is true: infants’ abilities to track briefly occluded objects depend on a system of object indexes.
occlusionendarkening
violation-of-expectations

Charles & Rivera (2009)

How does help us with the puzzles?
Object indexes can survive occlusion ...
... but not the endarkening of a scence
But why do we get the opposite pattern with search measures?

Functions of object indexes:

✔ influence how attention is allocated

✔ guide ongoing actions (e.g. visual tracking, reaching)

✘ initiate purposive actions

Object indexes and beliefs can conflict ...

Scholl 2007, figure 4

The hypothesis has an advantage which I don’t think is widely recognised. This is that object indexes are independent of beliefs and knowledge states. Having an object index pointing to a location is not the same thing as believing that an object is there. And nor is having an object index pointing to a series of locations over time is the same thing as believing or knowing that these locations are points on the path of a single object. Further, the assignments of object indexes do not invariably give rise to beliefs and need not match your beliefs.
To emphasise this point, consider once more this scenario in which a patterned square disappears behind the barrier; later a plain black ring emerges. You probably don't believe that they are the same object, but they probably do get assigned the same object index. Your beliefs and assignments of object indexes are inconsistent in this sense: the world cannot be such that both are correct.

Mitroff, Scholl and Wynn 2005, figure 2

Mitroff, Scholl and Wynn 2005, figure 3

So this is a virtue of the hypothesis that four- and five-month-old infants’ abilities to track briefly occluded objects depend on a system of object indexes. Since assignments of object indexes do not entail the existence of corresponding beliefs, the fact that infants of this age systematically fail to search for briefly occluded objects is not an objection to the hypothesis.
occlusionendarkening
violation-of-expectations

Charles & Rivera (2009)

So why do 5 month olds fail to manifest their ability to track briefly occluded objects by initiating searches for them after they have been fully occluded?
Because object indexes are independent of beliefs and do not by themselves support the initiation of action. Further, I guess that occlusion interferes with motor representations of objects in infants because occlusion involves two objects, one in front of the other.
But we still have to explain this ...
Why do infants succeed in searching for momentarily endarkend objects? Because they can represent objects motorically, and endarkening does not immediately interfere with such representations. What does this mean?

Cardellicchio, Sinigaglia & Costantini, 2011 figure 1

Cardellicchio, Sinigaglia & Costantini, 2011 figure 2

Object indexes survive occlusion but not endarkening; motor representations survive endarkening but not occlusion.
survive occlusionsurvive endarkening
object index
motor representation

McCurry et al 2009, figure 1

Why do 5 month old infants reach towards the cloth screen more often when a cube goes in and a circle comes out than when a cube goes in and a cube comes out?
Here's the authors' description of their procedure. 'Once the ball came to rest at the right edge of the platform, the platform was pushed forward until the edge of the platform was directly in front of, and within easy reach of, the infant. In the second phase, the infant was allowed to search for 20 s. ' \citep{mccurry:2009_beyond}
What should we predict? Cloth screen does not prevent action,\footnote{ ‘In the first familiarization trial, infants were shown the fringed-screen and were encouraged to reach through the fringe. If necessary, the experimenter gently guided the infant’s hand through the fringed-screen. Once the infant placed his or her hand through the fringed-screen twice, the trial ended.’ } so reaching should be possible. Further, if motor representations are responsible for the effect, the fact that the experiment requires sensitivity to featural information should not be an issue. (Further, a version of this task using violation of expectations may fail because featural information is critical.) And although these are very far from the terms in which they interpret their findings, this is exactly what McCurry et al 2009 found.

McCurry et al 2009, figure 2

Object indexes survive occlusion but not endarkening; motor representations survive endarkening but not occlusion.
survive occlusionsurvive endarkening
object index
motor representation
occlusionendarkening
violation-of-expectations

Charles & Rivera (2009)

\emph{The CLSTX conjecture} Infants’ abilities concerning physical objects are characterised by the Principles of Object Perception because infants’ abilities are a consequence of the operations of a system of object indexes \citep{Leslie:1998zk,Scholl:1999mi,Carey:2001ue,scholl:2007_objecta}.

The CLSTX conjecture:

The principles of object perception

are not things believed or known:

instead

they characterise the operation of

object indexes.

Leslie et al (1989); Scholl and Leslie (1999); Carey and Xu (2001)

(‘CLSTX’ stands for Carey-Leslie-Scholl-Tremoulet-Xu \citep[see][]{Leslie:1998zk,Scholl:1999mi,Carey:2001ue,scholl:2007_objecta})

... and infants have a further capacity to track physical objects which involves motor representations and processes.

Return to this amazing discovery.

Three Questions

1. How do four-month-old infants model physical objects?

2. What is the relation between the model and the infants?

3. What is the relation between the model and the things modelled (physical objects)?

2. What is the relation between the model and the infants?

Candidate Answers to Q2

the Simple View ... generates incorrect predictions

the Core Knowledge View ... generates no relevant predictions

the CLSTX Conjecture

 

Core Knowledge vs Object Indexes

 
\section{Core Knowledge vs Object Indexes}
 
\section{Core Knowledge vs Object Indexes}
Consider the conjecture that infants’ abilities concerning physical objects are characterised by the Principles of Object Perception because infants’ abilities are a consequence of the operations of a system of object indexes. If this conjecture is true, should we reject the claim that infants have a core system for physical objects? Or does having a system of object indexes whose operations are characterised by the Principles of Object Perception amount to having core knowledge of those principles?
\emph{Outstanding problem} Since having core knowledge of objects does not imply having knowledge knowledge of objects, how can the emergence in development of knowledge of simple facts about particular physical objects be explained? What is the role of core knowledge of objects, and what other factors might be involved?
Let’s consider some consequences of the CLSTX conjecture.
\emph{The CLSTX conjecture} Infants’ abilities concerning physical objects are characterised by the Principles of Object Perception because infants’ abilities are a consequence of the operations of a system of object indexes \citep{Leslie:1998zk,Scholl:1999mi,Carey:2001ue,scholl:2007_objecta}.

The CLSTX conjecture:

The principles of object perception

are not things believed or known:

instead

they characterise the operation of

object indexes.

Leslie et al (1989); Scholl and Leslie (1999); Carey and Xu (2001)

(‘CLSTX’ stands for Carey-Leslie-Scholl-Tremoulet-Xu \citep[see][]{Leslie:1998zk,Scholl:1999mi,Carey:2001ue,scholl:2007_objecta})
We saw this quote in the first lecture ...

‘if you want to describe what is going on in the head of the child when it has a few words which it utters in appropriate situations, you will fail for lack of the right sort of words of your own.

‘We have many vocabularies for describing nature when we regard it as mindless, and we have a mentalistic vocabulary for describing thought and intentional action; what we lack is a way of describing what is in between

(Davidson 1999, p. 11)

Actually we don’t lack a way of describing what is in between. We already have it. We were simply not aware of it because we hadn’t thought carefully enough about the representations and processes involved in perception and action.
The discovery that the principles of object perception characterise the operation of object-indexes doesn't mean we have met the challenge exactly. We haven't found a way of describing the processes and representations that underpin infants' abilities to deal with objects and causes. However, we have reduced the problem of doing this to the problem of characterising how some perceptual mechanisms work. And this shows, importantly, that understanding infants' minds is not something different from understanding adults' minds, contrary to what Davidson assumes. The problem is not that their cognition is half-formed or in an intermediate state. The problem is just that understanding perception requires science and not just intuition.
What is the relation between infants' competencies with objects and adults'? Is it that infants' competencies grow into more sophisticated adult competencies? Or is it that they remain constant throught development, and are supplemented by quite separate abilities?

 

infant

 

 

adult

 

 

social interaction

language

 

 

time --->

The identification of the Principles of Object Perception with object-indexes suggests that infants' abilities are constant throughout development. They do not become adult conceptual abilities; rather they remain as perceptual systems that somehow underlie later-developing abilities to acquire knowledge.
Confirmation for this view comes from considering that there are discrepancies in adults' performances which resemble the discrepancies in infants between looking and action-based measures of competence ... [This links to unit 271 on perceptual expectations ...]

The Core Knowledge View?

‘Just as humans are endowed with multiple, specialized perceptual systems, so we are endowed with multiple systems for representing and reasoning about entities of different kinds.’

Carey and Spelke, 1996 p. 517

‘core systems are

  1. largely innate
  2. encapsulated
  3. unchanging
  4. arising from phylogenetically old systems
  5. built upon the output of innate perceptual analyzers’

(Carey and Spelke 1996: 520)

representational format: iconic (Carey 2009)

Which of these features are features of a system of object indexes?
Left half:

The Core Knowledge View

Infants, like most adults, do not know the principles of object perception; but they have core knowledege of them.

right_half:

The CLSTX conjecture

The principles of object perception characterise how a system of object indexes should work.

Infants’ (and adults’) object indexes track objects through occlusion.

Five-month-olds do not know the location of an occluded object.

Five-month-olds do have perceptual expectations concerning its location.

‘CLSTX’ stands for Carey-Leslie-Scholl-Tremoulet-Xu \citep[see][]{Leslie:1998zk,Scholl:1999mi,Carey:2001ue,scholl:2007_objecta}
Are these two views compatible? I think we had better characterise core knowledge in such a way that they turn out to be true!

Next Big Problem

Our Next Big Problem is this. We've said that infants' competence with causes and objects is not knowledge but something more primitive than knowledge, something which exists in adults too and can carry information discrepant with what they know. So, if at all, how does appealing to these early capacities enable us to explain the origins of knowledge?

Core Knowledge Isn’t Knowledge

... so how can we explain the developmental origins of knowledge?

Berthier et al, Where’s the ball reaching study
Further issue ... we now have a more complicated story about the emergence of knowledge
Broadly, my suggestion will be that the competence which appears in the first months of development leads to knowledge of objects and causes only in conjunction with various additional things, like social interaction, perhaps language and abilities to use tools.
The picture I want to offer differs from those of researchers like Vygotsky and Tomasello in that there is an essential role for early-developing forms of representation that are more primitive that concepts or thoughts and do not appear to have any kind of social origin.
But the picture also differs from those of researchers like Spelke and Carey in that these early developing forms of representation are only one of several components that are needed to understand the origins of knowledge.
To explore this idea I want to switch to a completely different domain, colour.
[*Aside on tool use:] Basic forms of tool use may not require understanding how objects interact (Barrett, Davis, & Needham; Lockman, 2000), and may depend on core cognition of contact-mechanics (Goldenberg & Hagmann, 1998; Johnson-Frey, 2004). Experience of tool use may in turn assist children in understanding notions of manipulation, a key causal notion (Menzies & Price, 1993; Woodward, 2003). Perhaps non-core capacities for causal representation are not innate but originate with experiences of tool use.

conclusion

\section{Development is Rediscovery} How do you get from core knowledge to knowledge proper? \emph{The Assumption of Representational Connections}: the transition involves operations on the contents of core knowledge states, which transform them into (components of) the contents of knowledge states. Most proposals rely on this assumption, including: (i) Spelke’s suggestion that mature understanding of objects derives from core knowledge by virtue of core knowledge representations being assembled (\citeyear{Spelke:2000nf}); (ii) claims by Leslie and others that modules provide conceptual identifications of their inputs \citep{Leslie:1988ct}; (iii) Karmiloff-Smith’s representational re-description (\citeyear{Karmiloff-Smith:1992lv}); and (iv) Mandler’s claim that ‘the earliest conceptual functioning consists of a redescription of perceptual structure’ (\citeyear{Mandler:1992vn}). %\begin{itemize} %\item assembling core knowledge from different domains \citep{Spelke:2000nf} %\item modules provide conceptual identifications of their inputs %\citep{Leslie:1988ct} %\item representational re-description %\citep{Karmiloff-Smith:1992lv} %\item ‘the earliest conceptual functioning consists of a redescription of perceptual structure’ \citep{Mandler:1992vn} %\end{itemize} If object indexes influence actions only via phenomenal expectations, the Assumption of Representational Connections is wrong. \emph{Alternative assumption}: the transition depends only on the effects of core knowledge states on behaviour, attention, and sensation. Development is rediscovery: the emergence of knowledge involves rediscovering information already encoded as core knowledge.

1. Four- and five-month-olds can track briefly occluded objects

2. How?

Object indexes! (System of object indexes = core system)

3. How could the operations of object indexes explain patterns in looking duration?

Beliefs (because systematic failures to search)

Phenomenal expectations!

4. Development is ...

... assembling core knowledge

... redescription

... rediscovery

\section{Conclusion}
To conclude, I started by mentioning the wide variety of evidence that four- and five-month-olds can track briefly occluded objects. This evidence raises the question, How do infants do that? On the leading, best supported hypothesis, four- and five-month-olds’ abilities to track briefly occluded objects depend on a system of object indexes like that which underpins multiple object tracking or object-specific preview benefits. This hypothesis also has the virtue of being consistent with the most straightforward explanation of why infants of this age (four- to five-months) and even older systematically fail to manually search for occluded objects. (The explanation is that they lack beliefs about the locations of objects.)
Accepting this hypothesis forces us to confront a question. How could the operations of object indexes explain patterns in looking duration? This question arises because facts about the operations of object indexes do not themselves straightforwardly imply anything about how things seem to infants, nor about what they believe.
The answer, I suggested, is phenomenal expectations. Much as there are phenomenal expectations associated with the ease or difficulty of processing a complex stimulus like a face or letter sequence, so also phenomenal expectations are associated with operations involving object indexes. These phenomenal expectations are not intentional relations to the phyiscal objects whose behaviours normally cause them. Instead they can be thought of as sensations in roughly Reid’s sense. So they are monadic properties of perceptual experiences which carry information about physical objects.
Importantly, phenomenal expectations (like sensations) require interpretation. In order to get from a phenomenal expectation to a belief you need to form a view about what the phenomenal expectation is a sign of. This requires learning, and your view can change as you learn more.
This has consequences for understanding the emergence in development of knowledge of physical objects. Such knowledge is probably a consequence of the (core) system of object indexes, but on the view I have been defending the two can be only indirectly related. Having core knowledge of objects is a matter of having a system of object indexes. The system can affect what you believe or know about objects only by way of phenomenal expectations. Gaining knowledge proper requires interpreting the phenomenal expectations, and so is in part a matter of rediscovering information already processed by your core systems.

How do humans first come to know simple facts about particular physical objects?

The question is ... How do humans first come to know simple facts about particular physical objects?
Here’s what we’ve found so far.
We examined how three requirements on having knowledge of physical objects are met. Knowledge of objects depends on abilities to (i) segment objects, (ii) represent them as persisting and (iii) track their interactions. To know simple facts about particular physical objects you need, minimally, to meet these three requirements.

Three requirements

  • segment objects
  • represent objects as persisting (‘permanence’)
  • track objects’ interactions
The second discovery concerned how infants meet these three requirements this.

Principles of Object Perception

  • cohesion—‘two surface points lie on the same object only if the points are linked by a path of connected surface points’
  • boundedness—‘two surface points lie on distinct objects only if no path of connected surface points links them’
  • rigidity—‘objects are interpreted as moving rigidly if such an interpretation exists’
  • no action at a distance—‘separated objects are interpreted as moving independently of one another if such an interpretation exists’

Spelke, 1990

The second was that a single set of principles is formally adequate to explain how someone could meet these requirements, and to describe infants' abilities with segmentation, representing objects as persisting and tracking objects' interactions.
This is exciting in several ways. \begin{enumerate} \item That infants have all of these abilities. \item That their abilities are relatively sophisticated: it doesn’t seem that we can characterise them as involving simple heuristics or relying merely on featural information. \item That a single set of principles underlies all three capacities. \end{enumerate}
Return to this amazing discovery.

Three Questions

1. How do four-month-old infants model physical objects?

2. What is the relation between the model and the infants?

3. What is the relation between the model and the things modelled (physical objects)?

2. What is the relation between the model and the infants?

Candidate Answers to Q2

the Simple View ... generates incorrect predictions

the Core Knowledge View ... generates no relevant predictions

the CLSTX Conjecture

Let me make some more points about it.
First, it works in concert with a claim about motor representation. We neeed this claim otherwise we haven't fully explained the discrepancy between looking and action-based measures for representing objects as persisting and tracking their causal interactions. After all, why do these perceptual representations of objects--the object indexes--not guide purposive actions like reaching and pulling? This is an issue we shall return to.
Second, it leaves us with a question we didn't have before. What is the relation between these abilities to segment objects, represent them as persisting and track their causal interactions and knowledge about objects? Clearly having an object-index stuck to an object is not the same thing as having knowledge about the object's location and movements. (If it were, we'd face just the problems that are fatal for the Simple View.) What then is the relation between these things?

Only phenomenal expectations

connect ‘core knowledge’ of objects

to thought.

Phenomenal expectations have been quite widely neglected in philosophy and developmental psychology. They are a means by which cognitive processes enable perceivers to acquire dispositions to form beliefs about objects’ properties which are reliably true. Phenomenal expectations provide a low-cost but efficient bridge between non-conscious cognitive processes and conscious reasoning.

Development is rediscovery.

If you accept my story about phenomenal expectations then you also face a problem understanding the how the existence of core knowledge systems can explain the emergence of knowledge in development.