A Dual Process Theory of Mindreading

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A-tasks

Children fail

because they rely on a model of minds and actions that does not incorporate beliefs

Children fail A-tasks because they rely on a model of minds and actions that does not incorporate beliefs.

non-A-tasks

Children pass

by relying on a model of minds and actions that does incorporate beliefs

Children pass non-A-tasks by relying on a model of minds and actions that does incorporate beliefs.

dogma

the

of mindreading

The dogma of mindreading (momentary version): any individual has at most one model of minds and actions at any one point in time.

There is also a developmental version of the dogma: the developmental dogma is that there is either just one model or else a family of models where one of the models, the best and most sophisticated model, contains all of the states that are contained in any of the models.

This is the puzzle I wanted to solve ... it forces us to ask two questions

Two questions: \begin{enumerate} \item How do observations about tracking support conclusions about representing? \item Why are there dissociations in nonhuman apes’, human infants’ and human adults’ performance on belief-tracking tasks? \end{enumerate}

Q1

How do observations about tracking support conclusions about representing models?

Q2

Why are there dissociations in nonhuman apes’, human infants’ and human adults’ performance on belief-tracking tasks?

We answered the first question ...

The question I’ve been asking remains unanswered: How does any of this help us with the question of why there are dissociations? ...

1. models [done]

2. processes

The idea was that if we study processes, we might understand the causes of the dissociations. But we’ve been focussed on ADULTS ...

implicit / modular
/ ‘system-1’ / ...

innate

informationally encapsulated

domain specific

subject to limited accessibility

speedy

tacit

subpersonal

unconscious

...

An immediate problem is, Which one or several of these features should we appeal to in characterising implicit mindreading? Everyone seems to have their own ideas.

To me, a more pressing problem is that ...

None of these properties can explain why there is an interaction with age with respect to particular measures of belief tracking,

Nor can they explain why there are dissociations in adults between performance on different measures.

For instance, what had domain specificity

or limited accessibility got to do with the fact that adults’ proactive gaze and response times fail to track false beliefs in some contexts? Would the theory be any different if proactive gaze were aligned with verbal responses?

a fresh start

We need to make a fresh start in distinguishing implicit from explicit mindreading ...

Start with a simple causal model.

‘response 1’ is a variable representing which response the subject will give. [Which values it takes will depend on what sort of response it is (e.g. a verbal response, proactive gaze, button press.) We can think of it as taking three values, one for correct belief tracking, one for fact tracking, and one for any other response.]

‘process 1’ and ‘process 2’ are variables which each represent whether a certain kind of mindreading process will occur and, if so, what it’s outcome is.

And the arrows show that the probability that response 1 will have a certain value is influenced by the value of the variables process 1 and process 2 (and by other things not included in the model). So it should be possible to intervene on the value of ‘process 1’ in order to bring about a change in the value of ‘response 1’.

[I’ve used thicker and thinner arrows informally to indicate stronger and weaker dependence. Strictly speaking the width has no meaning and this model doesn’t specify exactly how the values of variables are related, only that they are.]

Of course, much the same is true for ‘response 2’ as well. It’s just that the changing the values of other variables will have different effects on the values of ‘response 1’ and ‘response 2’.

[Limit: this depiction ignores time, which is of course critical.]

We must avoid a false assumption about the relation between types of response and kinds of process ...

Process 1 -> Response 1

Process 2 -> Response 2

The false assumption is that responses of type R1 are dominated by one mindreading process whereas responses of type R2 are dominated by another mindreading process. But responses types and processes may not be so closely associated, of course.

This is because (a) any response is likely to be a consequence of multiple processes; and, (b), for some response types such as button selection or proactive gaze, changing factors like time pressure could change which mindreading process dominates responses of that type.% \footnote{% In fact variability in the relation between a mindreading process and a response type is a potentially useful source of evidence in support of a dual process theory of mindreading. Changes in the processes determining a response type can be detected where we have situations in which we know, or assume, the two processes yield different answers (cf Todd et al). }

So what does a Dual Process Theory of Mindreading claim? The core claim is just this:

Dual Process Theory of Mindreading (core part)

Two (or more) mindreading processes are distinct:
the conditions which influence whether they occur,
and which outputs they generate,
do not completely overlap.

\textbf{You might say, this is a schematic claim, one totally lacking substance.} You’d be right: and that’s exactly the point.

A key feature of this Dual Process Theory of Mindreading is its \textbf{theoretical modesty}: it involves no a priori committments concerning the particular characteristics of the processes.

First, the conditions under which one or another response type tracks beliefs should vary.

1.a E.g. changing the \textbf{instructions} should reduce the probability that responses of one type will track beliefs without much affecting the probability that responses of the other type will track belief.

Evidence for this includes studies by Schenider et al

1.b Or, e.g., changing the \textbf{content of the belief} to be tracked from location to identity, say, should reduce the probability that responses of one type track beliefs without much affecting the probability that responses of the other type will track beliefs.

Evidence for this includes studies by Low and his collaborators.

1a+b. And, ideally, it should be possible find different conditions that reduce the probability that different responses track beliefs.

Further, the probability that responses of these two types track beliefs should be differently affected by factors such as time pressure and cognitive load. (It isn’t important that either is entirely unaffected; what matters is just that the effects are different.)

As far as I know we don’t yet have direct evidence for this, because few studies have compared what happens to two response types as factors like time pressure or cognitive load are varies. There is, of course, some evidence that responses of some types are less susceptible to cognitive load than others (e.g. \citet{qureshi:2010_executive} on L1 VPT).

So far I’ve been working with a simplifying assumption about the relation between types of response and kinds of process.

Process 1 -> Response 1

Process 2 -> Response 2

I’ve been assuming that responses of type R1 are dominated by one mindreading process whereas responses of type R2 are dominated by another mindreading process. But responses types and processes may not be so closely associated, of course.

This is because (a) any response is likely to be a consequence of multiple processes; and, (b), for some response types such as button selection or proactive gaze, changing factors like time pressure could change which mindreading process dominates responses of that type.

In fact variability in the relation between a mindreading process and a response type is a potentially useful source of evidence in support of a dual process theory of mindreading. Changes in the processes determining a response type can be detected where we have situations in which we know, or assume, the two processes yield different answers (cf Todd et al). For example ...

To illustrate, take the case where we instruct subjects to track the location of a ball. Subjects are asked to press a button to indicate whether a ball is present or absent. We know that button selection will not track beliefs when subjects are not under time pressure. But what happens if we increase time pressure.

It is possible that increasing time pressure will very slightly, but perhaps measurably increase the probability that button presses are dominated by a different mindreading process, one that is less sensitive to instructions. In that case, we would expect to observe slightly more belief tracking in the responses as time pressure is increased.

\citet{todd:2016_dissociating} have recently demonstrated this type of effect for L1-VPT; as far as I know, it has not yet been demonstrated for belief tracking.

So what does a Dual Process Theory of Mindreading claim? The core claim is just this:

Dual Process Theory of Mindreading (core part)

Two (or more) mindreading processes are distinct:
the conditions which influence whether they occur,
and which outputs they generate,
do not completely overlap.

What about development?

The model of minds and actions underpinning automatic mindreading process does not significantly change over development.

By contrast, the model of minds and actions underpinning nonautomatic mindreading process does significantly change over development. In the first three or four years of life, nonautomatic mindreading processes involve relatively crude models of minds and actions, models which do not enable belief tracking. What changes over development is typically just that the model underpinning nonautomatic mindreading becomes gradually more sophisticated and eventually comes to enable belief tracking.

Conjecture: \begin{enumerate} \item Automatic and nonautomatic mindreading processes both occur from the first year of life onwards. \item The model of minds and actions underpinning automatic mindreading process does not significantly change over development. \item In the first three or four years of life, nonautomatic mindreading processes involve relatively crude models of minds and actions, models which do not enable belief tracking. \item What changes over development is typically just that the model underpinning nonautomatic mindreading becomes gradually more sophisticated and eventually comes to enable belief tracking. \end{enumerate}

Low et al, 2014 figure 2

There is what Low et al’s results are really showing us.