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What models of minds and actions
underpin which mental state tracking processes?
What models of minds and actions
underpin which mental state tracking processes?
Fact:
Minimal theory of mind specifics a model of minds and actions,
one which could in principle characterise how infants (or nonhuman apes, corvids or other animals) track mental states.
Conjecture:
Nonhuman mindreading processes are characterised by a minimal model of minds and actions.
Evidence?
Q1
How do observations about tracking support conclusions about representing models?
Q2
Why are there dissociations in nonhuman apes’, human infants’ and human adults’ performance on belief-tracking tasks?