Click here and press the right key for the next slide (or swipe left)
also ...
Press the left key to go backwards (or swipe right)
Press n to toggle whether notes are shown (or add '?notes' to the url before the #)
Press m or double tap to slide thumbnails (menu)
Press ? at any time to show the keyboard shortcuts
What Is Core Knowledge?
Q1 What is the nature of infants’ earliest cognition of physical objects?
The leading answer is that involves a ‘third type’ of representation,
something distinct from perception and knowledge
‘there is a third type of conceptual structure,
dubbed “core knowledge” ...
that differs systematically from both
sensory/perceptual representation[s] ... and ... knowledge.’
Carey, 2009 p. 10
Consider a crude, but hopefully very familiar picture of the adult mind.
The mind has different bits, and these are to an interesting extent independent of each other.
And there are at least three kinds of state, epistemic, motoric and perceptual.
Crude Picture of the Mind
- epistemic
(knowledge states) - broadly motoric
(motor representations of outcomes and affordances) - broadly perceptual
(visual, tactual, ... representations; object indexes ...)
These three kinds of state are not inferentially integrated.
They can also come apart in the sense that there can be multiple
representations in you simultaneously which can’t all be correct.
For example, there can be discrepancies between your knowledge of
a physical object’s location and where your perceptual systems represent it as being.
Given this crude picture, we might guess that a similar distinction applies to
infants’ minds.
Then we can ask, Which kind of representation does
their abilities to track briefly occluded objects involve?
We know it isn’t knowledge because this view generates incorrect predictions.
We also know it isn’t motoric, because motor representations depend on
possibilities for action and when an object is occluded by a barrier which
prevents action, it becomes impossible to act on the object.
And, on the face of it, the representation cannot be perceptual.
After all, in most of the experiments there is only visual information an occluded object
is not providing visual information about its location.
(Interestingly, infants’ problem with searching for occluded objects is not simply caused
by an absence of perceptual information concerning the object.
(\citeauthor{moore:2008_factors} has a toy make a noise continuously:
they found that eight-month-olds failed to search for a toy irrespective
of whether it made a noise \citep[Experiment 2]{moore:2008_factors}.)
So we seem to have a problem ... this was the attraction of invoking something
exotic like core knowledge
Q1 What is the nature of infants’ earliest cognition of physical objects?
‘there is a third type of conceptual structure,
dubbed “core knowledge” ...
that differs systematically from both
sensory/perceptual representation[s] ... and ... knowledge.’
Carey, 2009 p. 10
core knowledge / core system
For someone to have \textit{core knowledge of a particular principle or
fact} is for her to have a core system where
either the core system includes a representation of that principle or
else the principle plays a special role in describing the core system.
So we can define core knowlegde in terms of core system.
‘Just as humans are endowed with multiple, specialized perceptual systems, so we are endowed with multiple systems for representing and reasoning about entities of different kinds.’
Carey and Spelke, 1996 p. 517
‘core systems are
- largely innate
- encapsulated
- unchanging
- arising from phylogenetically old systems
- built upon the output of innate perceptual analyzers’
(Carey and Spelke 1996: 520)
representational format: iconic (Carey 2009)
What do people say core knowledge is?
\subsection{Two-part definition}
There are two parts to a good definition. The first is an analogy that
helps us get a fix on what we is meant by 'system' generally. (The second
part tells us which systems are core systems by listing their
characteristic features.)
‘Just as humans are endowed with multiple, specialized perceptual systems,
so we are endowed with multiple systems for representing and reasoning
about entities of different kinds.’
\citep[p.\ 517]{Carey:1996hl}
So talk of core knowledge is somehow supposed to latch onto the idea of a system.
What do these authors mean by talking about 'specialized perceptual systems'?
They talk about things like perceiving colour, depth or melodies.
Now, as we saw when talking about categorical perception of colour, we can think of the 'system' underlying categorical perception as largely separate from other cognitive systems--- we saw that they could be knocked out by verbal interference, for example.
So the idea is that core knowledge somehow involves a system that is separable from other cognitive mechanisms.
As Carey rather grandly puts it, understanding core knowledge will involve understanding something about 'the architecture of the mind'.
Illustration: edge detection.
‘core systems are:
\begin{enumerate}
\item largely innate
\item encapsulated
\item unchanging
\item arising from phylogenetically old systems
\item built upon the output of innate perceptual analyzers’ \citep[p.\ 520]{Carey:1996hl}
\end{enumerate}
\textit{Note} There are other, slightly different statements
\citep[e.g.][]{carey:2009_origin}.
‘We hypothesize that uniquely human cognitive achievements build on systems
that humans share with other animals: core systems that evolved before the
emergence of our species.
The internal functioning of these systems depends on principles and processes
that are distinctly non-intuitive.
Nevertheless, human intuitions about space, number, morality and other
abstract concepts emerge from the use of symbols, especially language, to
combine productively the representations that core systems deliver’
\citep[pp.\ 2784-5]{spelke:2012_core}.
This, them is the two part definition. An analogy and a list of features.
There is one more feature that I want to mention; this is important
although I won't disucss it here.
To say that a represenation is iconic means, roughly, that parts of the
representation represent parts of the thing represented.
Pictures are paradigm examples of representations with iconic formats.
For example, you might have a picture of a flower where some parts of the
picture represent the petals and others the stem.
\subsection{The Core Knowledge View}
The \emph{Core Knowledge View}: the principles of object perception are not
knowledge, but they are core knowledge. And we generate expectations from
these principles by a process of inference.
Why postulate core knowledge?
The Simple View
The Core Knowledge View
The first problem we encountered was that the Simple View is false.
But maybe we can appeal to the Core Knowledge View.
According to the Core Knowledge View, the principles of object perception, and maybe also the
expectations they give rise to, are not knowledge.
But they are core knowledge.
This raises some issues. Is the Core Knowledge View consistent with the claims that
we have ended up with, e.g. about categorical perception and the Principles of Object
Perception characterising the way that object indexes work?
I think the answer is, basically, yes. Categorical perception involves a system that has
many of the features associated with core knowledge.
[*looking ahead (don’t say):]
Consider this hypothesis.
The principles of object perception, and maybe also the expectations they give rise to, are not knowledge.
But they are core knowledge.
The \emph{core knowledge view}: the principles of object perception are
not knowledge, but they are core knowledge.
But look at those features again --- innate, encapsulated, unchanging and the rest.
None of these straightforwardly enable us to predict that core knowledge
of objects will guide looking but not reaching.
So the \emph{first problem} is that (at this stage) it's unclear what we
gain by shifting from knowledge to core knowledge.
| domain | evidence for knowledge in infancy | evidence against knowledge |
| colour | categories used in learning labels & functions | failure to use colour as a dimension in ‘same as’ judgements |
| physical objects | patterns of dishabituation and anticipatory looking | unreflected in planned action (may influence online control) |
| number | --""-- | --""-- |
| syntax | anticipatory looking | [as adults] |
| minds | reflected in anticipatory looking, communication, &c | not reflected in judgements about action, desire, ... |
The Core Knowledge view may also help us to resolve
Discrepant Findings in other domains too ...
Why postulate core knowledge?
The Simple View
The Core Knowledge View