Objections to Core Knowledge

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‘Just as humans are endowed with multiple, specialized perceptual systems, so we are endowed with multiple systems for representing and reasoning about entities of different kinds.’

Carey and Spelke, 1996 p. 517

‘core systems are

largely innate
encapsulated
unchanging
arising from phylogenetically old systems
built upon the output of innate perceptual analyzers’

(Carey and Spelke 1996: 520)

representational format: iconic (Carey 2009)

Recall that we defined core systems by listing properties. [(Actually it was a two-part definition so there’s hope.)]

multiple definitions

One objection is that there are multiple definitions, each slightly different from the others, and no obvious way to choose between them.

But although this indicates that we need to impose some theoretical discipline, it doesn’t seem like an objection that could show there is a deep problem with the notion of Core Knowledge.

Here is a second objection ...

One reason for doubting that the notion of a core system is explanatory arises from the way we have introduced it. We have introduced it by providing a list of features. But why suppose that this particular list of features constitutes a natural kind? This worry has been brought into sharp focus by criticisms of 'two systems' approaches. (These criticisms are not directed specifically at claims about core knowledge, but the criticisms apply.)

‘there is a paucity of … data to suggest that they are the only or the best way of carving up the processing,

‘and it seems doubtful that the often long lists of correlated attributes should come as a package’

\citep[p.\ 759]{adolphs_conceptual_2010}

Adolphs (2010 p. 759)

‘we wonder whether the dichotomous characteristics used to define the two-system models are … perfectly correlated …

[and] whether a hybrid system that combines characteristics from both systems could not be … viable’

\citep[p.\ 537]{keren_two_2009}

Keren and Schul (2009, p. 537)

This is weak.

Remember that criticism is easy, especially if you don't have to prove someone is wrong.

Construction is hard, and worth more.

Even so, there is a problem here.

‘the process architecture of social cognition is still very much in need of a detailed theory’

\citep[p.\ 759]{adolphs_conceptual_2010}

Adolphs (2010 p. 759)

Is definition by listing features (a) justified, and is it (b) compatible with the claim that core knowledge is explanatory?

So far I've been explaining objection (a). Now let me say a bit more about (b) ...

We can get the strongest objection by asking ...

Why do we need a notion like core knowledge?

domain	evidence for knowledge in infancy	evidence against knowledge
colour	categories used in learning labels & functions	failure to use colour as a dimension in ‘same as’ judgements
physical objects	patterns of dishabituation and anticipatory looking	unreflected in planned action (may influence online control)
number	--""--	--""--
syntax	anticipatory looking	[as adults]
minds	reflected in anticipatory looking, communication, &c	not reflected in judgements about action, desire, ...

So why do we need a notion like core knowledge? Think about these domains. In each case, we're pushed towards postulating that infants know things, but also pushed against this. Resolving the apparent contradiction is what core knowledge is for.

Key question: What features do we have to assign to core knowledge if it's to describe these discrepancies?

In the case of Physical Objects, we want to expalin this puzzling pattern of findings ...

	occlusion	endarkening
violation-of-expectations	✔	✘
manual search	✘	✔

Charles & Rivera (2009)

If this is what core knowledge is for (if it exists to explain these discrepancies), what features must core knowledge have?

If this is what core knowledge is for, what features must core knowledge have?

‘Just as humans are endowed with multiple, specialized perceptual systems, so we are endowed with multiple systems for representing and reasoning about entities of different kinds.’

Carey and Spelke, 1996 p. 517

‘core systems are

largely innate
encapsulated
unchanging
arising from phylogenetically old systems
built upon the output of innate perceptual analyzers’

(Carey and Spelke 1996: 520)

representational format: iconic (Carey 2009)

Which of these features explain the discrepancy between measures on which infants do, and measures on which they do not, manifest their abilities to track physical objects?

Why do they fail on some search tasks and but pass some v-of-e tasks when the mode of disappearance is occlusion?

And, equally pressingly, why do they do the converse (pass search, fail v-of-e) when the mode is endarkening?

Encapsulated : there are limits on what information can get into the system. But if we are to explain any successes, it must be possible for information about the locations of physical objects to get into the system. So there’s no way we can use encapsulation to explain the puzzling developmental findings.

So, to return to my question,

If this is what core knowledge is for, what features must core knowledge have?

not being knowledge

The answer seems to be: none of the features that are stipluated in introducing it. This gives us a \textbf{first objection}: there seems to be a mismatch between the definition and application.

[The feature we most need is actually missing from their list: limited accessibility. But this thought comes later.]

summary

objections to the Core Knowledge View:

multiple definitions
justification for definition by list-of-features
definition by list-of-features rules out explanation
mismatch of definition to application

The Core Knowledge View
generates
no
relevant predictions.

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